Program for the National Budget Conference & Economic Growth Forum FY 2019/18

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Session 1: Agriculture and Agro-Industrialization Constraints to Promotion & Value Addition in Uganda's Coffee Sector





Outline

1. Uganda's Coffee Sector: some facts

2. Description of potential new IGC project:

Quality Upgrading and Contract Enforcement in Uganda's Coffee Sector, joint with Lauren Bergquist (Michigan) and Ritwika Sen (Kellogg)

this relates to the assigned focus question (and others):

How can the regulatory system for input and output markets be strengthened or reorganized to enforce quality?

Global Coffee: Production


Uganda is an important player



Source: International Coffee Organization, 2017/18


Global Coffee: Production

Uganda is an important player in both coffee varieties




Uganda's Macroeconomics:


Coffee is a stable contributor to FX earnings (15%)




Poverty reduction in Africa lags other regions




Within Africa



Within Africa: Uganda impressive progress




Within Africa: Uganda impressive progress, benefits of 1990s agricultural reform




Source: World Development Indicators, 2016; Bibangambah (1996), Akiyama (2001), authors calculations on UCDA reports (various), Bank of Uganda

Google Search Activity




Source: author's calculation on Google Trends, accessed August 31, 2018

Google Search Activity




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
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
Ugandan Coffee Spreads compared to the ICO Price Index *Reflects some of the lack of the awareness and maybe quality of UG coffee*




Source: authors calculation on ICO data, 2000/01 – 2016/17

Ugandan Varieties

Over 23% of exports Arabica, and growing



Uganda Arabica Most dynamic market in East Africa with highest growth potential



Source: ICO; y-axis is '000 of 60 kg bags

Ugandan Coffee Exporters: Market Structure Snapshot *Dominated by a few players*

Rank	2009/10		2014/15		2017/18*	
1	Kyagalanyi Coffee Ltd	401,404	Ugacof (U) Ltd	625,986	Kyagalanyi Coffee Ltd	491,298
2	Ugacof Ltd	336,554	Kyagalanyi Coffee Ltd	345,272	Ugacof (U) Ltd	461,446
3	Kawacom (U) Ltd	331,667	Kawacom (U) Ltd	314,285	Ideal Commodities	392,429
4	Savannah Commodities Ltd	206,321	Olam (U) Ltd	278,598	Olam (U) Ltd	380,719
5	Great Lakes Co Ltd	201,158	Ibero (U) Ltd	246,195	Ibero (U) Ltd	247,418
6	Ibero (U) Ltd	186,406	Ideal Commodities	233,187	Touton Uganda Limited	213,893
7	Kampala Domestic Store	154,242	Export Trading Company	192,238	Export Trading Company (U) Ltd	192,159
8	Olam (U) Ltd	153,548	Kampala Domestic Store	178,142	Kawacom (U) Ltd	176,379
9	Job Coffee	147,502	Besmark Coffee Co. Ltd	156,803	Besmark Coffee Co. Ltd	147,636
10	Pan Afric Impex	125,041	Ishaka Commodities	107,245	Kampala Domestic Store	121,190
Top 10 - Volume		2,243,843		2,677,951		2,824,567
Total Industry - Volume		2,668,971		3,455,852		3,664,506
Share of top 10		84%		77%		77%

- Concentration patterns similar across EA
- Mix of domestic and MNCs
- Market structure is important for interventions and regulation

Ugandan Coffee Global Buyers: Market Structure Snapshot *Dominated by a few players*

Rank	2009/10		2014/15		2017/18*	
1	Ecom Agro-industrialists	289,803	Sucafina	569,567	Sucafina	429,663
2	Sucafina	228,504	Olam International	333,729	Olam International	390,006
3	Socadec	220,685	Ecom Agro Industrialist	262,441	Al-Tasheel	232,902
4	Abaco International	202,722	Bernhard Rothfoss	257,845	Volcafe	218,042
5	Bernhard Rothfoss	179,883	Al-Tasheel	217,508	Touton Geneva S.A	164,359
6	Aldwami	169,784	Aldwami	147,710	Bernhard Rothfoss	147,484
7	Olam International	149,946	Icona Café	122,762	Ecom Agro Industrialist	144,494
8	Decotrade	135,240	Socadec	112,845	Aldwami	137,200
9	Volcafé	120,517	Strauss Commodities	107,846	Bernhard Rothfos	106,038
10	Cofftea (Sudan)	98,684	Abaco International	96,220	Strauss Commodities	82,413
Top 10 - Volume		1,795,768		2,228,473		2,052,601
Total Industry - Volume		2,668,971		3,455,852		3,661,636
Share of top 10		67%		64%		56%

- Prominent global buyers similar across EA
- Mainly traders not roasters*
- Many have signed up for procuring more sustainable and traceable coffee in the near future

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
How can the regulatory system for input and output markets be strengthened or reorganized to enforce quality?

Major drivers of Value in Arabica

Multiple actors and their incentives




Uganda Arabica Broadly a Tale of Two Regions




Uganda's Price Curves


Arabica and Robusta varieties 2017/18*




Uganda's Price Curves: Upgrade *Arabica and Robusta varieties 2017/18**



Uganda's Price Curves: Upgrade *Arabica and Robusta varieties 2017/18**



Uganda's Price Curves: Upgrade and Quantity *Arabica and Robusta varieties 2017/18**



What are the constraints to exporting high quality coffee out of Uganda?

Diagnosis of supply chain reveals challenges at:

- 1. Farm gate
- 2. Export gate [hulling/exporter/UCDA]

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Stakeholder interviews suggest that close to 60% of coffee trees are being sold in forward contracts. With such a large magnitude of coffee cherries potentially subject to premature harvest and damage, this may be a major factor depressing the supply of high-quality cherries eventually available to exporters.

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[Farmers also have no longer incentive to tend to their trees (the "fruit" is not theirs anymore) implies no soil conservation, no pruning...

Future consequences on yield and quality: traders are not farmers they intensely strip trees which implies following harvest yields are worse]

Farmers are not rewarded to produce high-quality beans. Prima facie this seems puzzling as the "premium" over low quality should incentivize high-quality production. However discussions with farmers suggest that they are not receiving a sufficient price premium.

As one farmer put it: "Why should I invest in producing high quality when there is always someone there to buy low quality?"

The answer to this should be that one can receive a higher price for producing higher quality, but it seems the price differences that farmers experience is not large enough to encourage them to exert effort to produce high-quality cherries.

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One hypothesis, as suggested by the farmer quoted above, is that although there is an abundance of traders willing to buy low-quality beans, there are not enough traders active in high-quality buying. Limited access to working capital or other constraints limit traders from engaging in high-quality buying. The result may be that stronger competition among low-quality buyers artificially raises the price offered to farmers for low-quality beans (relative to high-quality).

Quality Upgrading & Contract Enforcement in Supply Chain *Farm Gate: solutions to Test with Exporter (s) and UCDA*

To address the problem of:

- Lack of farmer working capital
- Lack of contract enforcement

• Price premiums too small to encourage farmers to produce high quality


• Too little competition among high quality buyers

Test the solution of:

- Offer harvest-time loans to farmers to encourage farmers to wait to harvest coffee trees until mature
- Mechanisms for enforcing contracts: involvement of LC1 courts (formal), involvement of binding arbitration (informal), contract rubber stamped with official government seal, blockchain technology
- Offer greater price premiums for high quality to traders (and see how much gets passed on to farmers) vs. directly to farmers (via exporter)
- Offer working capital to potential high quality buyers to encourage entry and greater competition

Quality Upgrading & Contract Enforcement in Supply Chain *Farm Gate: Policy Response*





- . Current rules and regulation (*The Coffee* Regulations 1994) does not cover farm gate
- Limited capacity of UCDA to monitor and enforce at farm gate (circa 50 extension workers for the whole country)

What are the constraints in exporting high quality coffee out of Uganda?

Diagnosis of supply chain reveals challenges at:

- 1. Farm gate
- 2. Export gate [hulling/exporter/UCDA]

2. Export gate, "facts":

	Export
	Regulation
Moisture	11-12%

Defects

Robusta	10%
Arabica Washed	10%
Arabica Unwashed (DRUGAR)	10%

2. Export gate, "facts":

	Export	Often
	Regulation	Exported
Moisture	11-12%	15%
Defects		
Robusta	10%	20%
Arabica Washed	10%	10%
Arabica Unwashed (DRUGAR)	10%	30%

2. Export gate [hulling/exporter/UCDA]

<u>Farmer level</u>: monitoring defects would be involving – counting defects and flotation tests; <u>challenging to fix [gold standard Costa Rica]</u>

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<u>**Trader/Hulling level:**</u> traders arriving with *kiboko* and selling *FAQ*, don't have moisture meters, so push low prices to farmers – monitoring and enforcement at this level is <u>challenging to fix</u>, many micro-hullers and traders – unless license + certify the traders and hullers, training on quality standards should be part of the process

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Exporter/UCDA level:

- when exporters purchase from traders a *Form-5* is issued by UCDA officer,
 <u>enforceability of standards is weak</u>
- when exporters export a export certificate needs to be issued that the coffee is export standard, <u>enforceability of standards is weak</u> due to limited incentives to reject export coffee (need volumes!) and <u>GOVERNANCE</u>
- Here an opportunity: exporters are small in numbers, <u>consistent</u> and <u>uniform</u> adherence to export standards by UCDA will ripple through the supply chain and intermediaries will react but need <u>capacity</u> at UCDA

Thank You Feedback Welcome



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